According to Figure 1.7, what was the approximate annual rate of improvement in hard disk capacity provided by new drive technologies (the solid lines)?
Explanation
This question tests the ability to interpret the slopes of the lines in the critical Figure 1.7 and synthesize information from the surrounding text. The core concept is that the pace of technological improvement is almost always faster than the pace at which customers in a given market can absorb it.
Other questions
Why does the author use the hard disk drive industry as the primary case study for why great firms fail?
What is the 'technology mudslide hypothesis' mentioned in Chapter 1?
Which of the following best characterizes a 'sustaining technology' according to the examples in Chapter 1?
What was the paradoxical finding about why the best firms in the disk drive industry failed?
According to Table 1.1 (1981), how did the 5.25-inch drive compare to the 8-inch drive in terms of unit cost?
In the context of the disk drive industry, what pattern was observed regarding the leadership of established firms versus entrant firms in technological changes?
What was the primary reason that Seagate's marketers and executives initially rejected the 3.5-inch drive, despite their engineers having developed prototypes?
What was a defining characteristic of the firms that successfully pioneered disruptive disk drive architectures like the 8-inch and 5.25-inch drives?
Between 1967 and 1973, by what factor did the information density on disk surfaces increase?
What was the significance of the 2.5-inch drive's introduction by Prairietek and Conner Peripherals?
What does Figure 1.6, 'Leadership of Established Firms in Sustaining Technologies,' generally illustrate?
The first disk drive, RAMAC, developed by IBM between 1952 and 1956, had which of the following specifications?
What happened to the price per megabyte of disk storage as cumulative production of terabytes doubled, according to the experience curve in Figure 1.3?
Why were the new applications for disruptive drive technologies (e.g., minicomputers, desktop PCs) often described as 'emerging markets'?
By 1985, what percentage of the firms that produced 8-inch drives had introduced 5.25-inch models?
What is the third pattern in the history of disk drive innovation summarized at the end of Chapter 1?
When the 8-inch drives began to invade the mainframe market, how did their performance compare to the established 14-inch drives?
By 1991, what was the primary use for Seagate's 3.5-inch drives?
What does the term 'established firms' refer to in the context of Chapter 1's analysis?
In the comparison between 8-inch and 5.25-inch drives in 1981 (Table 1.1), what was the difference in physical volume?
What was the initial market application for the disruptive 8-inch drives developed between 1978 and 1980?
What does the author conclude about the 'technology mudslide' hypothesis after analyzing the disk drive industry?
In the case of the 3.5-inch drive, Conner Peripherals was a spinoff from which two established drive makers?
What was the fear of 'cannibalization' in the context of established firms considering disruptive technologies?
What percentage of the firms producing 5.25-inch drives in 1981 were entrants?
How did the attributes valued by customers in the minicomputer market differ from those in the emerging desktop computer market for disk drives?
What was the eventual fate of Prairietek, the entrant firm that announced a 2.5-inch drive in 1989?
Two years after the 8-inch drive was introduced, what percentage of the firms producing it were entrants?
What was the 'stunningly simple and consistent' factor that determined the success and failure of the industry's best firms?
How did IBM's introduction of the floppy disk drive in 1971 and the Winchester architecture in 1973 influence the industry?
Between 1976 and 1986, how many firms that entered the rigid disk drive industry using thin-film heads were successful?
What was the 'downward vision and mobility' problem faced by established firms?
By the mid-1980s, 8-inch drive makers were able to provide the capacities required for which market, causing them to invade it?
What does the author identify as the first pattern in the history of innovations in the disk drive industry?
In the case of Seagate's response to the 3.5-inch drive, why was the decision not to pursue it initially considered 'rational' from the company's perspective?
What happened to the majority of the original seventeen firms populating the disk drive industry in 1976?
The first growth wave for 5.25-inch drives followed a 'new application' for rigid disk drives. What was this primary new application?
What was the result of the physical size reduction of the smallest available 20 MB drive from 800 cubic inches in 1978 to 1.4 cubic inches by 1993?
Why were minicomputer makers, the customers for 8-inch drives, initially 'of no interest' in the first 5.25-inch drives?
Which statement accurately describes the performance of a disruptive technology when it first emerges?
The author concludes that established firms were 'held captive' by what?
What was the initial response of the leading 14-inch drive makers to the emergence of 8-inch drives?
The transition from ferrite heads to thin-film heads is an example of what kind of technological change?
What was the state of the 1.8-inch disk drive market in 1995?
On average, how much did established 8-inch drive makers lag behind entrants in introducing 5.25-inch models?
In what way were the new-architecture drives introduced by incumbent firms (e.g., 8-inch drives from 14-inch makers) performance-competitive when they finally launched?
What does Figure 1.8, 'Leadership of Entrant Firms in Disruptive Technology,' illustrate across all four charts?
The emergence of the desktop personal computer market segment occurred roughly in what period?
What was the second pattern in the history of disk drive innovation, as summarized at the end of Chapter 1?