The author suggests using consultants as one way to raise urgency. What specific role should they play in this stage?
Explanation
This question clarifies the specific, limited role of external consultants during the first stage of change: acting as a catalyst for honest self-assessment.
Other questions
According to Chapter 3, what is the very first step in any major change process?
In a firm with 100,000 employees, what is the approximate number of people who might be required to go far beyond their normal call of duty to produce a significant change?
What is the primary consequence of high complacency in an organization attempting a transformation?
Which of the following is NOT listed in Figure 3-1 as a source of complacency?
In the example of the complacent managers, what was the misleading performance standard they focused on?
What is the 'good rule of thumb' mentioned on page 44 regarding complacency?
Which of the following actions is presented in Table 3-1 as a way to raise the urgency level?
What is a potential downside of using a major financial crisis to generate urgency?
What role do middle and lower-level managers play in establishing urgency?
According to the chapter, what percentage of an organization's management needs to believe the status quo is unacceptable to achieve sufficient urgency for a major change effort?
What common mistake do people make when they see initial movement on a change effort, even with low levels of urgency?
What is described as a 'deadly' condition in a fast-moving world at the end of Chapter 3?
In the example of the complacent pharmaceutical company, what was the state of its stock price?
What is the 'kill-the-messenger-of-bad-news' culture described as a source of?
What was the initial, and incorrect, diagnosis of the twenty-five-year-old MBA students regarding the complacent company?
To counteract 'insider myopia,' what does the chapter recommend leaders do?
In the example of the Japanese entrepreneur on page 48, what 'artificial crisis' did he create to fight complacency despite record profits?
What does the author suggest is a key reason that brave, revolutionary middle managers often fail when top management is against change?
According to the example on page 43, the marketing group achieved 94 percent of its objectives, which was a source of complacency. Why was this misleading?
What does the author identify as the problem with an 'absence of a major and visible crisis'?
What is one of the 'bold moves' suggested on page 45 to combat the complacency fueled by 'too many visible resources'?
In what timeframe does the author suggest a business unit might be given to become first or second in its markets before facing divestiture or closure?
Human nature is listed as a source of complacency. What specific capacity of human nature is highlighted?
What is the danger of skipping Stage 1 (Establishing Urgency) and moving directly to later stages?
In the complacent pharmaceutical company described on page 39, what was a typical management meeting like?
What percentage of employees in the 'worst cases' does the author estimate know their company is underperforming but feel blocked?
Why can 'too many visible resources,' like a luxurious headquarters, be a source of complacency?
According to Table 3-1, what should be done with 'happy talk' from senior management?
What is the author's view on aggressively removing signs of excess, like a large corporate air force, when profits are high?
What is the risk of having organizational structures that focus employees on narrow functional goals?
The smart career decision for a middle manager in a complacent firm with no leadership for change might be to do what?
What is the primary reason transformations fail when complacency is high?
Bombarding people with information on future opportunities and the organization's current inability to pursue them is a tactic to do what?
In the author's experience, which group is often UNAFFECTED by the sources of complacency and thus can be a source of accurate information?
What is the main problem with a 'sit back and wait' attitude for a lower-level change agent when senior leadership is complacent?
The author argues that leaders can create 'artificial crises.' Which example is given of a leader named Harry doing this?
A manager seeing profits up 10 percent over last year feels good. What additional information, mentioned on page 42, would have created more urgency?
What is the danger of having performance feedback systems that only provide data from internal sources?
Why must leaders 'have the courage to listen carefully' to outsiders, according to page 52?
The author notes that a smart and capable executive may still fall into the trap of skipping Stage 1. Why does this happen?
What is the primary danger of a 'low-candor, low-confrontation culture'?
On page 47, the author suggests it is possible to initiate change even when a company is making record profits. How?
Why do bold moves that reduce complacency, like creating a large quarterly loss, often increase conflict and create anxiety?
What is the typical reaction in a complacent organization when a manager tries to grab resources from another department?
According to the author, what is often the most significant challenge in establishing a sense of urgency?
What is the key condition needed for middle or lower-level managers to successfully drive change in their own units?
At what point in the change process must a company deal with complacency?
What is the main reason that cautious managers, who have been rewarded for it for years, find it difficult to push up urgency levels?
According to the final paragraph of Chapter 3, what must leaders be willing to be at odds with to get the necessary external data?