By 1991, what was the status of Seagate's 3.5-inch drive sales, years after its belated introduction?
Explanation
This question highlights Step 6 of the failure pattern: even when established firms belatedly launch a disruptive product, they often lack the cost structures, channels, and capabilities to succeed in the new value network, and end up using the product defensively in their old one.
Other questions
According to Chapter 2, what is the third theory proposed to explain why good companies can fail, beyond managerial/organizational impediments and capabilities/radical technology explanations?
What does the concept of a 'value network' primarily define for a firm?
According to the analysis in Figure 2.3, which value network placed the highest monetary value on an incremental megabyte of disk capacity in 1988?
Based on Figure 2.4, what was the characteristic gross margin required by mainframe disk drive makers to be profitable in their value network?
Why is it difficult to plot a disruptive innovation on a conventional technology S-curve chart like the one in Figure 2.5?
In the decision-making pattern of established firms facing disruption, what was the first step observed by Christensen?
When Seagate's marketing personnel tested the new 3.5-inch drive prototypes with their lead customers (IBM), what was the response?
What was the result of Step 3, where established firms 'Step Up the Pace of Sustaining Technological Development'?
In Step 4 of the failure pattern, who typically formed the new companies to exploit disruptive technologies?
What characterized the marketing approach of the start-up companies in Step 4, as they looked for applications for their disruptive products?
What is meant by the 'asymmetrical' views of downmarket and upmarket movements described in Step 5?
In the case study of flash memory, what does the 'capabilities viewpoint' predict about which disk drive makers would succeed?
What did the 'organizational structure framework' of Henderson and Clark predict about established firms' success with a radical technology like flash memory?
According to the technology S-curve framework, what would one predict about the threat of flash memory to magnetic disk drives as of 1995?
What is the ultimate prediction of the 'value network framework' regarding the efforts of firms like Quantum and Seagate to build a flash card business?
What was the growth of the flash card market from 1993 to 1994, and what was the forecast for 1996?
According to the chapter, what is one of the five propositions summarizing the perspective of the value network framework?
What does the author mean when he says disruptive innovations are 'complex' for incumbent firms, even if technologically simple?
When do established firms' decisions to ignore technologies that don't meet their customers' needs become fatal, according to Proposition 3?
What is the 'attacker's advantage' that entrant firms have over established firms in disruptive innovations, according to Proposition 4?
In the context of product architecture and value networks, how are companies embedded in value networks?
In Tracy Kidder's 'The Soul of a New Machine,' what did the Data General employee see when he removed the cover of a competitor's minicomputer?
What defines the boundaries of a value network, according to the chapter?
According to the hedonic regression analysis on page 41, how much were customers in the minicomputer value network willing to pay for an incremental megabyte of capacity in 1988?
Which factor, besides a rank-ordering of product attributes, also characterizes a specific value network?
How did Seagate's forecast for annual sales of the disruptive 3.5-inch drive compare to the forecast for a new sustaining 5.25-inch drive model (the ST412)?
By 1995, what percentage of the flash card market had Quantum and Seagate managed to capture?
What does the 'technology mudslide hypothesis,' mentioned in Chapter 1 and revisited in Chapter 2, suggest?
The popular slogan 'stay close to your customers' appears to be what kind of advice, according to the findings in Chapter 2?
What was Seagate's response between 1985 and 1987 after its executives shelved the 3.5-inch project?
What is the key difference between the capabilities explanation for failure and the value network explanation?
According to the chapter, why do sustaining projects almost always preempt resources from disruptive projects in established firms?
How did start-ups like Conner Peripherals manage to move upmarket after establishing a base in an emerging market?
According to the value network framework, what is the predictive power of technology S-curves?
In the mainframe computer value network shown in Figure 2.2, what were the key performance attributes for disk drives?
What happened to the founders of the 8-inch drive maker Micropolis, and the founders of Shugart and Quantum?
What was the initial application for flash memory that accounted for 1.3 billion dollars in industry revenues by 1994?
How did Seagate enter the flash market in 1993, according to the text?
What does Clark's concept of 'technological hierarchies' focus on as a key determinant of a company's capabilities?
The research of Tushman, Anderson, and their associates found that firms often failed when a technological change did what?
In the author's synthesis, what determines a firm's perceptions of the economic value of a new technology?
What type of product innovation did the architectural design of a mainframe MIS system, as shown in Figure 2.1, represent?
What happens to the allocation of resources in established firms, according to the pattern described on page 36?
In Figure 2.2, what different set of firms supplied disk drives for the Computer-Automated Design value network versus the Corporate MIS value network?
The theory that a firm's organizational structure determines its ability to innovate in certain ways is primarily associated with which scholars mentioned in the chapter?
What was the result of established firms belatedly jumping on the disruptive technology bandwagon in Step 6?
What does the author identify as the primary reason for Seagate's decision to shelve the 3.5-inch drive in 1985, as described on page 51?
In the author's analysis, where do the opposing strengths and weaknesses of incumbent and entrant firms in innovation come from?
According to the value network framework, why did the initial applications for flash memory appear in devices like cell phones and not computers?