Case Study: The Collapse of Silicon Valley Bank

According to Chapter 4, what was the primary cause of Silicon Valley Bank's significant unrealized losses that precipitated its collapse?

On March 8, 2023, SVB reported a significant loss that triggered a bank run. What was the value of this reported loss and on what amount of securities sold?

According to Section 4.2, what was a significant governance red flag at SVB in the year leading up to its collapse?

At the end of 2021, what percentage of SVB's approximately USD 124 billion bond portfolio was hedged against a rise in interest rates?

What action did SVB take regarding its interest rate hedges in the first half of 2022, and what was the stated reason for this action?

By the end of 2022, what value of interest rate hedges remained on SVB's books, and what percentage of the bond portfolio did this represent?

Section 4.2 highlights SVB's unstable funding as a red flag. What was the estimated value of uninsured deposits at the end of 2021, and what percentage of total non-maturity deposits did this represent?

What was the implied duration of SVB's USD 95 billion Held-to-Maturity (HTM) book, as inferred from its unrealized GAAP loss?

According to Section 4.3.1, what would have been the state of SVB's equity at year-end 2022 without the benefit of GAAP accounting for its HTM portfolio?

From a Net Interest Income (NII) perspective for the year 2022, how did SVB appear, according to Section 4.3.2?

What was the estimated duration gap of SVB, assuming an average duration of 1 year for its tech-related deposits, and what was the implied loss for a 200 basis point upward shock?

To avoid being classified as an 'outlier bank' under the supervisory test on economic value of equity, what would the duration of SVB's deposits have needed to be greater than?

What does the term 'regulatory arbitrage' refer to in the context of SVB's behavioral assumptions, as mentioned in Section 4.3.4?

What was the primary characteristic of SVB's depositor base that made it particularly vulnerable?

As described in Section 4.4, what is the 'textbook case of mismanagement' at SVB primarily attributed to?

One of the main lessons summarized in Section 4.4 is that prudent ALM is crucial because accounting rules can do what?

In the context of SVB's collapse, what created the 'vicious cycle' described in Section 4.3.4?

What was the total value of SVB's assets at year-end 2022, and what was the value of its equity?

How much money did investors attempt to withdraw from SVB in a single day during the bank run in Q1:2023?

The case study concludes that one of the main lessons is that despite claims to the contrary, what poses a great potential danger on banks' balance sheets?

What was the increase in SVB's uninsured deposits from the end of 2020 to the end of 2021?

In April 2022, SVB made a 'poorly supported change in assumption' based on a consultant's study. What was the effect of this change?

What type of securities primarily constituted SVB's Held-to-Maturity (HTM) portfolio?

According to the analysis in Section 4.3.1, what was the estimated additional unrealized loss from the Available-for-Sale (AFS) book, on top of the loss in the HTM book?

What was SVB's average interest expense and average interest income for 2022, which contributed to its apparently healthy NII?

What was the founding year of Silicon Valley Bank?

Who did Michael S. Barr, Vice Chair for Supervision at the Federal Reserve, hold accountable for the failure of SVB?

What percentage of SVB's deposits were estimated to be from 'early and later stage tech money' from startups and VCs?

The case study explains that rising interest rates affect the behavior of PE / VC funds in two ways. What is one of these ways?

What was the date of SVB's collapse and seizure by its regulator?

What was the total unrealized loss on SVB's balance sheet when combining the hidden GAAP loss in the HTM book and the estimated loss in the AFS book?

The chapter highlights that supervisors identified interest rate risk deficiencies in SVB's CAMELS exams for 2020, 2021, and 2022. What was the outcome of these identifications?

What was the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insurance limit per depositor mentioned in the chapter?

SVB was the 16th largest U.S. bank in 2022 with assets exceeding what amount?

Under U.S. GAAP, how are securities classified as Held-to-Maturity (HTM) carried on the balance sheet?

Which of the following best describes the structural mismatch on SVB's balance sheet as identified in Section 4.3.3?

The chapter argues that SVB's management changed model assumptions about deposit duration. What was the unsubstantiated basis for this change?

What was the date that SVB's holding company, SVBFG, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy?

The case study notes that the assumptions for SVB's deposit duration model were unsubstantiated for several reasons. Which of the following is one of those reasons?

What was the total value of the bank run that SVB experienced, in which customers attempted to withdraw their deposits?

In the period leading up to the collapse, what happened to the position of Chief Risk Officer (CRO) at SVB?

What was the key difference in accounting treatment between Available-for-Sale (AFS) and Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities at SVB?

The case study suggests that one of the lessons from SVB's failure is the imperative of 'proper governance of interest rate risk management'. What specific failure at SVB exemplifies this lesson?

Why was a deposit duration of greater than 3.7 years considered a 'highly unreasonable assumption' for SVB?

What was the direct consequence of SVB unwinding USD 11 billion of its interest rate swaps 'to juice its P&L'?

At year-end 2022, SVB's equity represented what percentage of its total assets?

In addition to its senior leadership and board, who does Michael Barr's statement in Section 4.4 identify as having 'failed to take forceful enough action'?

Why did SVB's heavy concentration in the technology and life sciences sectors pose a significant risk?

What was the estimated unrealized loss hidden in SVB's Held-to-Maturity (HTM) book at year-end 2022?

Which two correlated developments in 2022 negatively impacted SVB, as described in Section 4.2?