Why was thin-slab casting technology initially unattractive to integrated steel mills' most profitable customers?
Explanation
This question explores a core characteristic of disruptive technologies: they underperform on the attributes most valued by the mainstream market, making them easy for incumbents and their best customers to dismiss.
Other questions
According to Chapter 4, what is the primary reason that prospects for growth and improved profitability in upmarket value networks often appear more attractive to well-managed companies?
As depicted in Figure 4.1, 'Upmarket Migration of Seagate Products', what was Seagate's strategic response when the disruptive 3.5-inch drive form invaded the desktop market from below between 1987 and 1989?
Based on Figure 4.2, what was the typical gross margin for the emerging 5.25-inch drive market in 1981, which established 8-inch drive makers were reluctant to enter?
What does Chapter 4 identify as the root of companies' upward mobility and downward immobility?
In the hypothetical conversations on page 96, why does the proposal for a higher-capacity, higher-speed disk drive sound more appealing to the manager than the one for a cheaper, smaller, lower-capacity drive?
According to the case of the 1.8-inch disk drive, what was the projected market volume for 1995, which the CEO of a large drive company dismissed?
What sector did the student in the Harvard MBA case discussion find a use for a 1.8-inch disk drive, a market that large drive makers were overlooking?
In the context of the steel industry, minimills initially entered the market by producing what low-quality, low-margin product?
By what year had steel minimills captured approximately 90 percent of the rebar market?
What was the response of integrated steel mills like Bethlehem Steel and USX as minimills attacked the lower tiers of the market?
What does Joseph Bower's model of resource allocation, cited on page 94, suggest about how most proposals to innovate are generated?
Why are middle managers often reluctant to back projects for disruptive technologies, according to Chapter 4?
What was the capital cost to build a cost-competitive steel minimill in 1995?
By 1996, what percentage of the North American sheet steel market had Nucor captured with its disruptive thin-slab casting facility?
The chapter concludes that the 'northeasterly migration' of integrated steel companies was a story of:
What is the 'asymmetric mobility' described on page 92?
According to the hedonic regression analysis summarized in Chapter 2 but referenced on page 94, what did higher-end markets consistently pay for?
What is the 'wheel of retailing' phenomenon, described by Professor Malcom P. McNair in the chapter notes?
In the case of the 1.8-inch drive, why was the CEO of the large company so certain there was no market, despite evidence to the contrary?
How did the gross margins of 8-inch drive makers compare to the requirements for firms in the minicomputer market they served?
What market share did minimills command in the North American steel market by 1985?
What does the chapter describe as a 'powerful magnet in the northeast corner of the disk drive and excavator trajectory maps'?
What paradox does the chapter highlight regarding the failure of integrated steel mills?
What three factors create powerful barriers to downward mobility for established firms?
What was the result of Bethlehem Steel's investments in high-quality sheet steel production during the 1980s on its market value?
Which company made the bold move into thin-slab casting, a disruptive technology that established integrated mills had carefully evaluated but rejected?
What is the chapter's final conclusion about the root cause of the failures it describes?
In the hypothetical dialogue on pages 96-97, what does the engineer with the downmarket disruptive idea say when asked if he has run the idea past any potential customers?
What is the 'most vexing managerial aspect' of the problem of asymmetric mobility described on page 97?
According to Figure 4.2 on page 93, how did the market size of 14-inch drives compare to the emerging 3.5-inch drive market in 1986?
What does the author identify as an 'important strategic implication' of the rational pattern of upmarket movement on page 101?
In the minimill steel example, what was the primary difference in raw materials between integrated mills and minimills?
Why were integrated steel makers 'almost relieved to be rid of the rebar business' when minimills entered?
Why does the chapter argue that firms are 'held captive to their needs' and not just their customers?
When Seagate's median capacity was squarely positioned in the desktop segment between 1983 and 1985, what was its general product strategy?
What does the chapter say about the proposals that don't clear the hurdles of a firm's resource allocation system?
How did Nucor view the rebar market compared to the integrated mills?
What type of product proposals will 'always win' in the tug-of-war for development resources in a well-run company?
What key advantage did minimills have over integrated mills that allowed them to be profitable in the low-end rebar market?
Which of these disk drive companies was NOT mentioned on page 100 as having missed the 5.25-inch generation by moving upmarket?
What was the labor-hour per ton efficiency of the most efficient minimill in 1995?
How much more costly was it to build a competitive integrated steel mill compared to a minimill in 1995?
What does the author suggest is the primary reason for the 'downward immobility' of established firms?
Which historical business figure's theory of the 'wheel of retailing' is cited as a parallel to the upmarket migration seen in the disk drive and steel industries?
When did Nucor build its first continuous thin-slab casting facility in Crawfordsville, Indiana?
What was the approximate cost that USX and Bethlehem Steel elected to invest in conventional thick-slab casters instead of the disruptive thin-slab technology?
According to the chapter, why do well-run companies populated by well-trained employees still fail to pursue disruptive technologies?
As described on page 101, minimills are named for what reason?
What does the author suggest is one of the most important achievements of any well-managed company, which paradoxically contributes to the innovator's dilemma?