As described in Figure 3.2, what was the trend for established steam shovel makers versus entrants during the transition to gasoline power between 1920 and 1934?
Explanation
This question contrasts the sustaining innovation of gasoline power (Figure 3.2) with the disruptive innovation of hydraulics (Figure 3.6), requiring the reader to interpret the chart for the sustaining transition correctly.
Other questions
According to Chapter 3, what was the primary reason for the widespread failure of established mechanical shovel manufacturers when confronted with hydraulic technology?
In the 1950s, approximately how many established manufacturers of cable-actuated equipment were in business, and how many successfully transitioned to become sustainable hydraulic excavator manufacturers by the 1970s?
The transition from steam-powered to gasoline-powered engines in the early 1920s is categorized in the book as what type of innovation?
According to the performance metrics of the mainstream market in 1945, what was the primary measure of an excavator's functionality?
Who developed the first hydraulic excavator, and in what year?
Based on Figure 3.3, which market segment demanded the smallest average bucket size for excavators between 1946 and 1982?
What was the initial bucket capacity of the earliest hydraulic excavators, making them unsuitable for mainstream excavation work?
Bucyrus Erie's 'Hydrohoe' product, introduced in 1951, is described as a hybrid because it used what combination of technologies?
In what year did the performance trajectory of hydraulic technology squarely intersect with the needs of the sewer and piping customer segment, marking a turning point in the industry?
What was the fundamental difference in the strategic approach to innovation between established firms and successful entrant firms in the excavator industry?
The Sherman 'Bobcat' power digger, a prominent early hydraulic product, was marketed as an attachment for what type of vehicle?
Once the performance of hydraulic excavators became good enough to meet the bucket-size requirements of mainstream markets, what did the basis of product choice shift to?
What was the rotation capability of the most flexible backhoes in the early hydraulic era, compared to the best cable excavators?
According to Figure 3.6, which group overwhelmingly dominated the hydraulic excavator market between 1948 and 1965?
Where did the few established excavator manufacturers that survived the hydraulic disruption find a safe, high-end market to continue their business?
The chapter draws a parallel between Bucyrus Erie's hybrid Hydrohoe and what other historical technology mentioned in a footnote?
What was the key difference in the value network for early hydraulic backhoes compared to the mainstream cable shovel market?
The trajectory of improvement in hydraulic excavator bucket size was significantly more rapid than the rate of improvement demanded by which market?
Which company's response to the emergence of hydraulic excavating technology is described as being keenly aware of the technology but marketing its product, the Hydrohoe, to the wrong customers?
Between 1947 and 1965, how many companies entered the mechanical excavation market with hydraulic products?
What does the author conclude was 'wrong' inside the companies that made cable-actuated excavators, leading to their failure?
In the early 1920s, which three companies were the leading innovators and dominant firms in gasoline engine technology for excavators?
What specific advantage did hydraulic excavators have over cable-actuated ones regarding the digging action?
The initial market for hydraulic excavators was found with residential contractors building large tract subdivisions after which wars?
By 1974, what was the maximum bucket size that hydraulic excavator engineers were able to provide, demonstrating the rapid pace of technological improvement?
What was the acronym for the hydraulic excavating approach that became the name of the third entrant to the market in the late 1940s?
Which statement best describes the reaction of mainstream customers (e.g., general excavation contractors) to early hydraulic excavators?
What happened to the population of mechanical shovel manufacturers as a result of the disruptive invasion of hydraulics?
What was a defining characteristic of the first markets for hydraulic excavators?
The triumph of hydraulic excavators over cable-actuated shovels took approximately how long?
What was the main flaw in Bucyrus Erie's strategy for its Hydrohoe product?
In the early 1920s, the industry faced a major technological upheaval when what was substituted for steam power?
What does the author identify as a key reason why 'good management' can be counterproductive when dealing with disruptive technology?
Caterpillar is mentioned in the chapter as what type of company in the hydraulic excavation market?
The pattern of failure in the mechanical excavator industry is presented as analogous to failures in which other industry central to the book?
What was a major logistical problem that limited the rate of increase in bucket size demanded by mainstream contractors?
According to the text, why did contractors eventually embrace hydraulic machines over cable-actuated ones once performance was sufficient?
In the early days of hydraulic excavators, the performance metrics that mattered to the new market of residential contractors were fundamentally different from the mainstream market. This situation is described as a difference in the what?
Between 1948 and 1961, which was the only established maker of cable-actuated shovels known to have launched a hydraulic excavator?
What was the initial customer base for the early, small hydraulic backhoes?
How did excavation contractors themselves contribute to sustaining innovations in the industry?
Which statement best describes the success rate of the largest steam shovel manufacturers in transitioning to gasoline power compared to the success rate of cable-actuated shovel manufacturers in transitioning to hydraulics?
According to the analysis in the chapter, how should established firms have viewed the challenge of commercializing hydraulic technology?
In the early 1920s, American excavator manufacturers were tightly clustered in which two geographic areas?
Why did Bucyrus Erie's Hydrohoe ultimately fail in the market for over a decade?
What does the author state is the 'dilemma' in managing disruptive technology, as exemplified by the excavator companies?
What type of contractors represented the 'early users' of hydraulic excavators?
The first hydraulic excavator, developed in 1947, was created by a company from which country?
What was the eventual fate of most of the firms that overran the excavation equipment industry at the point when hydraulics were still a disruptive technology?