Which of the following is NOT one of the four factors discussed on page 367 that affects the ease of sustaining collusion?
Explanation
The correct answer is actually 'The level of product differentiation'. I made a mistake in my initial thought process. Let me correct the JSON. The question asks which is NOT one of the factors. The four factors are (1) knowing who rivals are, (2) knowing who their customers are, (3) knowing when they deviate, and (4) ability to punish. These are elaborated on under the headings: Number of Firms, Firm Size, History of the Market, and Punishment Mechanisms. Product differentiation is not one of these specific factors discussed on page 367.
Other questions
According to the overview on page 351, what is a key characteristic of a sequential-move game?
In the normal-form game presented in Table 10-1, what is the payoff for Player A if they choose the strategy 'Up' and Player B chooses the strategy 'Right'?
What defines a dominant strategy in game theory?
In the pricing game shown in Table 10-2, what is the Nash equilibrium outcome?
In the advertising game in Demonstration Problem 10-4 (Table 10-3), how much profit can your firm expect to earn if it chooses its profit-maximizing strategy?
What is a key feature of a coordination game, as illustrated in Table 10-4?
In the employee monitoring game (Table 10-5), what strategy should a player adopt in the absence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium?
Which condition is necessary for a trigger strategy to successfully sustain a collusive outcome in an infinitely repeated game?
According to the analysis on page 367, why is collusion easier to sustain when there are fewer firms in the industry?
In a finitely repeated game with a known, certain final period and a single Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game, why does collusion typically fail?
In the entry game depicted in Figure 10-2, why is the Nash equilibrium where Firm A stays 'out' and Firm B threatens 'hard' not a subgame perfect equilibrium?
In the sequential bargaining game shown in Figure 10-4, what is the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for management?
What is the present value of a firm's profits in an infinitely repeated game if it earns $10 each period and the interest rate is 25 percent?
In the game from Demonstration Problem 10-6, firms agree to charge a high price. If the interest rate is 40 percent, what is the present value of firm A's profits if it does not cheat?
A manager using a secure strategy would choose the action that:
In the innovation game in Figure 10-3, what prevents your firm (A) from introducing the new product if there is no patent protection?
How does the 'Hollywood's (not so) Beautiful Mind' (Inside Business 10-1) bar scene misrepresent the concept of a Nash equilibrium?
What is the key difference between a one-shot game and a repeated game?
In Demonstration Problem 10-7, two cigarette firms play a repeated advertising game where the probability of the game ending is 10 percent. Why can they successfully collude by agreeing not to advertise?
What is the primary reason that firms like those in the waste industry (Inside Business 10-2) can use trigger strategies to enforce high prices?
In the product quality game (Table 10-8), what is the Nash equilibrium in a one-shot game?
What is the payoff for Player A in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential-move game in Figure 10-1?
What is 'tacit collusion' as described on page 368?
In the one-shot bargaining game in Table 10-6, what is the outcome if Management asks for 50 and the Union asks for 100?
Why would a firm offer a product guarantee, according to the application of infinitely repeated games to product quality on page 370?
What is the normal-form representation of a game?
In the game from Table 10-7, what is the one-shot Nash equilibrium payoff for Firm A?
What happens to the likelihood of sustaining collusion as the interest rate rises?
In the sequential-move production game in Figure 13-6 on page 424, what is the equilibrium payoff for Firm B (the follower)?
A game where players randomize over two or more available actions to keep rivals from predicting their action is said to involve a:
In the game presented in Table 10-1, what is the secure strategy for player A?
What is the key insight from the 'snake-oil salesman' example on page 375?
An extensive-form game is used to represent what type of game?
In Demonstration Problem 10-5, two players bargain over dividing a one dollar bill in one cent increments. Which of the following is a Nash equilibrium?
A pricing game is played where the one-shot collusive payoff is 20, the cheat payoff is 60, and the Nash equilibrium payoff is 5. According to the principle for sustaining cooperation with trigger strategies, what is the maximum interest rate at which collusion can be sustained?
How does the 'waterfall strategy' for international market entry, as described in Inside Business 10-3, differ from the 'sprinkler strategy'?
In the game from Table 10-1, if Player A plays their dominant strategy, what is Player B's best response?
What is the primary purpose of a decision node in an extensive-form game?
In Demonstration Problem 10-10, the sequential bargaining game is reversed so the union moves first. What is the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff for the union?
Which of the following is a one-shot game?
Why does a player using a secure strategy in the game from Table 10-1 fail to maximize their potential payoff?
In the pricing game in Table 10-2, what is Firm A's dominant strategy?
What is the maximum one-shot payoff a player can get by cheating on the collusive agreement in Table 10-7?
What does a player's strategy specify in a sequential-move game like the one in Figure 10-1?
In Demonstration Problem 10-9 on innovation, what would be Firm A's profit if it introduces a new product and Firm B does NOT clone it?
If two firms in a one-shot pricing game (Table 10-2) agree to collude and charge high prices, the situation is unstable because:
In the game from Table 10-1, is there a dominant strategy for Player B?
What condition must be met for a finitely repeated game with an uncertain end to support collusive outcomes?
In the innovation game (Figure 10-3 and Demonstration Problem 10-9), how does patent law change Firm A's optimal strategy?